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1.0 Introduction 
1.1 Perspectives on rationality 
In the behavioral sciences and in other disciplines, the area of decision making 
research has been given considerable attention. The main reason for this is that 
how we decide is a crucial phenomenon for the functioning of social systems. In 
fact, it can be argued that to what degree we are able to understand and interpret a 
social system depends on our knowledge of how people make effective decisions. 
In the discipline of psychology research has also to a high extent been concentrated 
on fundamental characteristics of basic mental functions that humans share with 
animals. Such processes are the acquisition of information from the environment, 
emotional reactions, learning, and memory. It is important to emphasize that no 
conflicts exist between the basic assumptions of these two directions within 
psychology. Higher mental processes like decision making has the potential of 
being linked to physiology. The connections are simply somewhat looser than to 
the basic mental processes (Campbell, 1986; Rachlin, 1989). 
At the same time the contribution of psychological research in decision making 
to other social sciences, especially economics, is essential. Many economists today 
realize that issues like cognitions, emotions, and behavior must be taken into 
account in their rational models (Lucas, 1986; Plott, 1986). Still, there exist some 
general differences between economics and psychology in the study of human 
decision making. First, whereas economists focus on outcomes, questions of 
process are central to psychologists. Thus, psychologists are both concerned with 
the manner in which decisions are made as well as with the characteristics of the 
participants and of their resource endowments. Second, the empirical evidence in 
psychology is experimental in nature. Much work in modern economics is 
theoretical, that is, many economists are more interested in deriving implications 
from theory than performing experiments and tests. Nevertheless, there is a 
growing interest for "experimental economics" among economists. This tendency is 
perhaps most apparent in areas such as marketing, accounting, and public policy. 
Over the years most investigations in the field of behavioral decision making 
have more or less explicitly dealt with the notion of rationality. On the one hand 
researchers have argued that all sorts of biases, errors, and inaccuracies speak 
against that people are generally rational. On the other hand, when faced with the 
suggestion that a person is irrational, the same researchers might have argued 
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against this and in favör of the good reasons of that person. Of course, issues like 
what is valid in general and exceptions from what is thought of as common can 
explain such different approaches which scientists have, but the rationality debate 
indicates underlying opposing perspectives (Berkeley & Humphreys, 1982; Cohen, 
1979; Edwards, 1983; Einhorn & Hogarth, 1981; Fischhoff, 1983; Kahneman & 
Tversky, 1982; Nisbett & Ross, 1980; Phillips, 1983). 
The rationality concept has been developed in philosophy and economics, and 
therefore these disciplines have had a great impact on the definition of the concept 
in psychology. The common assumption in behavioral sciences that people are 
expected to act in line with their values and beliefs, can be seen as an expression of 
this. A rational choice can according to Dawes (1988) be defined as one that meets 
three criteria: (i) It is based on the current assets of the decision maker. Assets 
include not only money, but physiological state, psychological capacities, social 
relationships, and feelings, that is vital phenomena for our well-being from a 
psychosomatic point of view. (ii) It is based on the possible outcomes of the 
choice. (iii) When these outcomes are uncertain, their likelihood is evaluated 
without violating the basic rules of probability theory. Such definitions have as 
their aim to satisfy the claims from philosophy that a rational action is "logical" or 
"consistent" as stated in a set of axioms. Rationality is hence specified normatively, 
that is, the mission of behavioral research is often to study empirically whether 
actual human behavior is rational in the sense that it obeys the norm. According to 
Dawes (1988) there are common decision making procedures that have no 
relationship to the criteria of rationality. They involve habit, tradition, conformity, 
convictions, and imitation. 
However, in modern cognitive psychology the use of a normative yardstick is 
becoming more and more rare. Nevertheless, there are exceptions. For instance, 
the physical environment is often regarded as a standard in the study of perceptual 
illusions. But this physical standard is usually not treated as a yardstick. Instead 
physical stimuli are used to trigger responses which are not regarded as "deviant 
from" or "consistent with" the stimuli being used. Another exception is the 
assumption of an ideal speaker or listener which was formerly widely used in 
psycho-linguistic research. The growing use of semantic network theories has 
however turned the focus of interest towards the understanding of actual human 
use of language. Yet another exception is that in research on thinking and 
reasoning formål logic is still used as a norm, but as in the case of psycho-
linguistics, the interest is slowly turning towards the content of thinking in place of 
its form. 
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In behavioral decision making research, normative models have, on the other 
hand, been heavily used since the early fifties. Research has had as its major 
objective to study, explain, and interpret discrepancies between predictions based 
on normative theories and actual decision/judgmental behavior. In the study of 
decisions the subjective expected utility (SEU) model represents the normative 
model which has been used whereas the most commonly used models of judgment 
are Bayes' theorem and multiattribute utility (MAUT) models. Much debate in the 
area still concerns these models, and the assumption agreed upon is the idea of 
rationality embodied in these models. 
Briefly, the subjective expected utility (SEU) model demonstrates that if a 
decision maker's choices follow certain mathematical axioms, it is possible to 
derive Utilities - or numerical values that represent the decision maker's values -
such that one alternative, which is probabilistic in nature, is preferred to another if 
and only if its expected utility (probability of winning multiplied by the amount to 
be won) is greater than that of the other alternative. One of these axioms or 
principles, the so-called invariance principle, is of central importance for the 
present studies. 
Bayesian inference can be regarded as an alternative to more classical 
approaches to statistical testing. The method is particularly useful for the updating 
of base-rate probabilities by specific data. For instance, this form of analysis deals 
more directly with the uncertainty of population characteristics, by making 
reference not to a population in itself but to our beliefs of the population. In 
Bayesian inference, these beliefs are characterized by probability distributions and 
density functions. 
Multiattribute utility theory (MAUT) concerns how to evaluate rationally and 
choose accordingly among alternatives in a multicriteria decision task. As a tool, it 
is used to support the decision maker and to improve his or her decision making. 
Four steps are of vital importance for the analysis: structuring objectives, eliciting 
preferences, scoring alternatives, and finally aggregating preferences and scores 
(Keeney & Raiffa, 1976; von Winterfeldt & Edwards, 1986). After performing 
these four steps the focus of the decision maker can switch to the implementation 
of action. 
1.2 General introduction to the present studies 
According to normative decision theory there exists a principle of procedure 
invariance which states that the preference order of a decision maker should remain 
the same, independently of which response mode is used. For example, the decision 
K) 
maker should reveal a preference indifference independently of whether he or she 
has to judge or decide. Nevertheless, previous research in behavioral decision 
making has suggested that judgments and choices yield different preference orders 
in both the risky and the riskless domain (Fischer & Hawkins, 1993; Goldstein, & 
Einhorn, 1987; Lichtenstein, & Slovic, 1971, 1973; Slovic, Griffin, & Tversky, 
1990; Slovic, & Lichtenstein, 1983; Tversky, Sattath, & Slovic, 1988;) In the 
latter, the prominence effect has been demonstrated. 
To account for violations of procedure invariance, several explanations which 
emphasize distortions in the weighting of attributes have been offered. In the risky 
context, both Expression Theory (Goldstein & Einhorn, 1987) and Change-of-
Process Theory (Mellers, Chang, Birnbaum, & Ordonez, 1992) give psychological 
explanations of the so-called preference reversals phenomena. In the riskless 
context, Contingent Weighting Theory (Tversky et al. 1988) provide a 
psychological account based primarily on decision-strategy compatibility. This 
latter account will here be subject to investigation. 
The possibility is also raised that violations of invariance in the riskless context 
can be explained by information restructuring approaches. Two such approaches 
have been launched. The first one builds on Dominance Structuring Theory 
(Montgomery, 1983) and Differentiation and Consolidation Theory (Svenson, 
1992). The general idea is that decision makers differentiate between alternatives 
by value and belief restructuring, by up or downgrading of alternatives according 
to decision rules or strategies. In the second approach, violations of invariance are 
assumed to be attributed to the information structure of the task which in many 
cases demand problem simplification (Payne, Bettman, Coupey, and Johnson, 
1990). 
The following questions are emphasized: What are the characteristics of making 
decisions in comparison with other similar activities, such as making preference 
judgments? How do situational factors affect the way decisions are made? In what 
respect is decision making and judging governed by constructive processes that 
take place during the process? Several of these questions will be dealt with in the 
present dissertation. 
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2.0 Violations of Invariance 
2.1 Assumptions of invariance 
Expected utility theory was published by John von Neumann and Oskar 
Morgenstern (1947) as a theory of declining marginal utility. It was proposed as a 
normative theory of decision, that is, its intention was to describe how people 
behave if they follow certain requirements of rational decision making. According 
to the theory decision makers are supposed to maximize expected utility, or 
personal value, rather than monetary outcomes of decisions. In gamble situations, 
the expected value of each risky alternative is therefore equal to the probability of 
winning multiplied by the amount to be won. 
A major objective of the theory was to provide an explicit set of assumptions, 
or axioms, as a basis for rational decision making. When these axioms were 
specified, decision researchers could use them to compare the mathematical 
predictions of expected utility theory with people's real behavior. A basic 
assumption was that people are able to express both consistent beliefs (predictive 
judgments) and consistent preferences (evaluative judgments). Another conjecture 
of the theory was that beliefs and preferences should be independent of each other, 
so that what you think is going to happen does not have an impact on what you 
would like to happen, or vice versa. Consequently, this theory of rational choice 
had as its main goal to describe the decisions of an idealized person. However, the 
theory says little about behavior per se; it is to a large extent a purely mathematical 
model that discusses utility theory 's relevance to optimal economic decisions. 
The dominance principle is one of the axioms of rational decision making. 
According to this principle, strategies which are "dominated" by other strategies 
should never be adopted by the decision maker. It is noteworthy that the principle 
only applies to situations where altematives are represented by several attributes, 
which can be ranked in importance order. Given these prerequisites, pairwise 
dominance tests of altematives can be used. The principle can in this way be used 
to reduce the choice-set of a decision situation, and it is therefore argued that it 
simplifies choice. 
The so called invariance principle is another of the axioms. It stipulates that the 
way options are presented should not affect the decision maker. In other words the 
choices of the decision maker should be invariant with respect to either how he or 
she is required to make the choice or the manner in which the options have been 
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presented. For example, in terms of response modes, the preference of a decision 
maker between two jobs should not be affected of whether the preference is to be 
stated in terms of a choice based on comparison, or by a contingent value 
judgment, that is by a pricing procedure of how much each job is worth. 
According to Tversky and Kahneman (1986) the four most basic rationality 
principles can be ordered by their normative appeal. The invariance principle 
together with the dominance principle seem to be the two most fundamental 
principles of decision theory and are commonly regarded as normatively essential. 
The status of the two other principles are more obscure: the transitivity principle 
could be questioned, and the cancellation principle has been rejected by many 
researchers. Thus, if the invariance and dominance principles are found to be 
invalid from a descriptive point of view, this would be most damaging to the 
normative theory. 
2.2 Distortions in attribute weighting 
One stream of research has dominated the debate on how humans make 
decisions. According to this stream, the nature of human judgment and decision 
making is emphasized as deficient. The general notion is that human capacity to 
make judgments and decisions is limited, leading to violations of the invariance 
principle (Jeans & Mann, 1977; Nisbett & Ross, 1980; Simon, 1955, 1979, 1986; 
Slovic, 1972; Tversky & Kahneman, 1974; see Jungermann, 1986, for a review). 
Violations of invariance can be explained in terms of the effect of different 
frames for the decision problem on people's decision making behavior (Payne, 
1982; Tversky & Kahneman, 1981). Often these instances are referred to as 
violations of descriptive invariance. According to Kahneman and Tversky (1979) 
coding outcomes in terms of gains and losses is one of several cognitive 
mechanisms which people use to edit, or represent, decision problems before the 
options will be evaluated. As in the case of judgmental biases these operations may 
as well lead to violations of rationality. The errors that occur are thought of as 
perceptual illusions (Tversky & Kahneman, 1981). In these situations, which are 
frame induced, subjects evaluate problems that differ in their surface structure but 
share the same basic deep structure. The explanation is that decision makers tend 
to operate on an edited version of the decision problem. 
A well-known failure of descriptive invariance was reported by McNeil, Pauker, 
Sox, and Tversky (1982). They were investigating preferences between medical 
treatments for lung cancer, and subjects were provided with the statistical 
background for the outcomes of these treatments. Two experimental conditions 
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were established, one in which subjects were informed about the mortality råtes of 
the treatments, another in which information was presented in terms of survival 
råtes. The expected values of the treatments of both conditions were equivalent. 
After the presentation of the problem, subjects were instructed to elicit their 
preferences. The results revealed a clear framing effect. The overall percentage that 
favored one form of therapy rose from 18% in the survival frame to 44% in the 
mortality frame. 
Recent research has also revealed violations of the invariance principle when 
risk is added to mortality and survival råtes (Tversky & Kahneman, 1981). In the 
so-called Asian disease problem two medical programs were presented, one of 
which the outcome was certain, the other of which it was uncertain. Outcomes 
were framed differently in two conditions, that is, in terms of people saved or 
people lost as a result of each program. The expected values of the two programs 
of each condition were equivalent. Again, the results were found to violate the 
invariance principle. Evidently, individuals' decision frames differed in crucial ways 
from a formål representation of the problem. 
Thus, variations in the framing of decision problems can produce systematic 
violations of the invariance principle, which are difficult to defend from a 
normative point of view. In trying to find a psychological explanation of why these 
violations occur, Kahneman and Tversky (1979) argued that the decision making 
process can be divided into two phases: an editing phase responsible for developing 
a decision frame and an evaluation phase during which the framed courses of 
actions are evaluated as a basis for choice. The operation of coding was suggested 
as a central process in the editing phase for the development of the decision frame. 
An important issue to examine is which mechanisms could ensure the invariance 
of preferences (Tversky & Kahneman, 1986). It has thus been suggested that 
invariance would be maintained if the outcomes of the two decisions are 
aggregated in one kind of frame prior to evaluation, for instance Ln terms of Iives 
saved. The violations of invariance that have been found can be viewed as 
indications of that people do not spontaneously aggregate coexisting courses of 
actions or use one frame for the outcomes. Still, the principle of invariance could 
hold even if multiple perspectives are maintained. This would require that the 
courses of actions were separately linear in probability and monetary outcome. 
However, the principle of invariance commonly fails due to the fact that the 
evaluation of outcomes and probabilities generally is non-linear, and because 
people do not use a common frame in their representations of the decisions. 
Failures of invariance can therefore be described in terms of framing effects that 
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control the representation of options, in combination with the nonlinearities of 
value and belief. 
The emphasis on editing or representation of decision problems has added 
something new to the research. Previously, scientist's major objective was 
concentrated to describe final judgments and evaluations on behalf of the earlier 
stages of the decision making process. 
Another important form of violation of the invariance principle is termed 
procedure variance. Situations belonging to this category are task induced, and the 
preference ordering is found to differ depending on the mode of response required 
by the task. A generally accepted explanation of violations of procedure invariance 
is that the response mode affects how the attributes are weighted. This issue is 
highlighted in the research on so-called preference reversals (e.g., Lichtenstein and 
Slovic, 1971, 1973; Slovic et al, 1990; Slovic & Lichtenstein, 1983, Tversky et al., 
1988; see Payne, Bettman, & Johnson, 1992, for a review). In normative theories it 
is assumed that specific empirical procedures like choice or pricing should give the 
same results. A preference reversal occurs whenever an individual prefers one 
alternative in one procedure but shows the opposite preference order in another. 
There is much evidence showing that the price ordering of risky prospects is 
systematically different from the choice ordering. For example, when subjects have 
to indicate which bets they prefer and how much they would be willing to sell the 
bets for, they often choose the high-probability option but indicate the highest 
selling price for the high-payoff option. The explanation of the phenomenon 
attributable to Lichtenstein and Slovic (1971, 1973) is that subjects in judgments 
set minimum selling prices by a process of anchoring and adjustment. As an 
example, subjects who find a gamble attractive are believed to anchor on the 
amount they stånd to win and then adjust downward for the amount and 
probability to lose. This is not the case in choice modes. Choice, it is argued, 
provides a freedom to use any decision strategy, whereas judgments often provide 
natural starting points, due to scale compatibility. In pricing, for instance, the 
natural starting point is provided in the gamble by the amount to win. Nevertheless, 
as many researchers know, probabilities are difficult for subjects to translate into 
monetary units. As a result, the adjustment downwards becomes insufficient, 
leading to a preference reversal. Because of this, an overpricing effect of gambles 
is established. However, it has been pointed o ut that this kind of adjustment is 
insufficient as an explanation (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). 
Other competing accounts of the preference reversals phenomena have been 
proposed by Goldstein and Einhorn, (1987) and Mellers et al. (1992). In 
Expression Theory, Goldstein and Einhorn (1987) state that previous research has 
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confounded judgment versus choice with the response scale used to express 
preference. For instance, prices have been expressed in dollars, ratings on rating 
scales. Instead, these factors are suggested to be crossed. They attribute the 
reversals found in the conditions to changes in the mapping from a gamble's 
components to the response. This transformation is assumed to differ predictably 
for each gamble and for each response mode. 
In Change-of-Process theory (Mellers et al. 1992), it is assumed that the 
stimulus context also has the ability to influence preference orders. It is proposed 
that the inclusion of certain stimuli "steer" subjects away from one decision 
strategy and toward another. Different preference orders are assumed when 
subjects use different procedures to evaluate the quality of gambles. Hence, people 
are supposed to use different decision strategies in different tasks with the same 
scales. Such tasks can be the rating of attractiveness and risk, pricing, and the 
judging of strength-of-preferences. 
In more recent research it has been established that the majority of reversals are 
violations of invariance, caused by over-pricing of the low-probability high-payoff 
bets (Tversky, Slovic, & Kahneman, 1990). Thus, intransitivity and failure of 
independence only account for a small proportion of the reversals (10%). The 
overpricing effect can be attributed to an effect of scale compatibility: When people 
are asked to set a price for how valuable the bet is, they look at how large the 
potential payoffs are. Payoffs are weighted more heavily in pricing than in choice 
because prices and payoffs are expressed in the same units. On the other hand, 
when people are asked to choose between two bets, they pay particular attention 
to the probability of winning. Thus, choosing between a pair of gambles seems to 
involve different psychological processes than bidding for each one separately. 
Response-mode biases have also been found when subjects are asked to 
evaluate pairs of decision alternatives whose consequences are described by two 
attributes. Tversky et al. (1990) and Slovic et al. (1988) demonstrated a judgment-
choice discrepancy, in the form of a riskless preference reversal, in such a case. 
One of the attributes was selected to be predominant or prominent. In choice tasks 
subjects placed more weight on this attribute than they did in matching tasks in 
which they were required to make the two options equally attractive. 
The compatibility hypothesis was proposed to account for the prominence effect 
(Tversky et al., 1988; Slovic et al., 1990; Fisher & Hawkins, 1993; Hawkins, 
1994). It is based on the pioneering work of Slovic (1975). In this hypothesis the 
effect reflects a general principle of compatibility according to which the 
processing of input (e.g., attributes describing options in a judgment or choice 
task) depends on how compatible it is with the output (i.e. subjects' responses). 
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Tversky et al. (1988) argued that both risky and riskless preference reversals are 
governed by stimulus-response compatibility. Identical components on both the 
stimulus and response side enhance compatibility. Such components are the use of 
the same scale units (e.g., grades, ranks), the direction of relations (e.g. whether 
the correlation between input and output variables is positive or negative), and the 
numerical correspondence (e.g., similarity between the input and output). The use 
of similar scale units have been referred to as scale compatibility by Fischer and 
Hawkins (1993) and Hawkins (1994). According to Slovic et al. (1990) the 
theoretical definition of scale compatibility is somewhat loose but its implications 
seem unambiguous. However, scale compatibility alone cannot account for the 
prominence effect (Hershey & Schoemaker, 1985; Schkade & Johnson, 1989; 
Slovic et al. 1990). It may account for variations in strength of preference found in 
different judgment modes, but in judgment-choice comparisons this type of 
compatibility can yield predictions directly opposed to the prominence effect 
(Fischer & Hawkins, 1993). For instance, if dollar is the prominent attribute, the 
scale-compatibility hypothesis implies that people will attach greater weight to 
money in dollar-matching tasks than in choice. 
Another suggestion is that the prominence effect occurs because choice and 
matching tasks evoke different types of decision strategies giving different weight 
to the prominent attribute (Tversky et al. 1988). The qualitative response in choice 
is regarded as compatible with a qualitative lexicographic decision rule which 
renders quantitative weighting of attributes unnecessary. In contrast, quantitative 
judgments are compatible with a quantitative weighted additive rule. This form of 
compatibility is referred to as strategy compatibility (Fischer & Hawkins, 1993; 
Hawkins 1994). The cognitive basis of this suggestion is twofold. First, as in the 
former case of scale compatibility, noncompatibility is regarded as requiring 
additional mental operations which subjects avoid. Second, a response mode is 
seen as priming the focus of attention on those compatible features of the input 
that are compatible with the required output. 
In conclusion, the theories provide cognitive explanations of violations of the 
invariance principle. For instance, observed response mood effects serve as a 
foundation for cognitive hypotheses, predicting which strategy is to be used in 
what response mode. A widely used perspective in this stream of research is that 
information processing capacity is limited, which leads to violations of rationality 
principles. The causes for this is often traced to the use of heuristics, to the 
representation of the problem, or to motivational factors. Normative models or the 
objective reality are not seldom used as rational yardsticks. A general growing 
consensus is that preferences and beliefs are constructive in nature. This means that 
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preferences for and beliefs about objects or events of any complexity are often 
constracted - not merely revealed- in the generation of a response to a judgment or 
choice task. This argument will also be highlighted in other directions of research 
to be reviewed. 
2.3 Cost-benefit theories 
A general idea put forward in cost-benefit theories is that decisions which 
violate the invariance principle nevertheless can be described as rational if the 
cognitive costs are taken into account. Hence, the decision costs must be weighted 
against the potential benefits resulting from the application of a decision strategy. 
This may lead to violations of invariance as it is stated in the subjective expected 
utility model (SEU). However, such violations are, according to the theories, 
perfectly rational (Beach, 1990; Beach & Mitchell, 1978, 1987; Einhorn & 
Hogarth, 1981). The selection of which decision rule or strategy is to be used (i.e., 
SEU, maximizing, satisficing, elimination-by-aspects, etc.) in a specific situation 
depends both of the decision maker's desire to make the best decision and his or 
her attitude towards investing time and effort in making a decision. Which strategy 
is perceived as superior in maximum net gain is the one being selected. Violations 
of invariance in the "classical sense" is thus something that the decision maker 
anticipates and tolerates. Which are then the benefits and costs for resolving the 
confiict inherent in choice, that is, which are the pros and cons of the engagement 
in the required mental effort? On the benefit side, one can put forward such gains 
as environmental control, clarifications of goals and preferences, creation of the 
habit of thinking, reformulation of problems which lead to discovering of new 
alternatives, and seeking ways of information that might resolve the confiict in 
choice. These five benefits are quite general in nature and apply across all kinds of 
consequential choice. It is interesting to note that the trade-offs of these benefits 
must be viewed from a temporal perspective. Short-term investments in terms of 
mental effort related to thinking and reasoning has long-term benefits in the sense 
of enhanced action control and improved capability of handling choice situations 
adequately. On the cost side, thinking and reasoning can be distressful in a state of 
preference uncertainty when you do not know what you want. A second cost of 
thinking is that the trade-offs in the decision situation are made visible. Third, since 
humans have a limited capacity to process information, there are costs due to 
acquiring, processing, and outputting information (Hogarth, 1987). 
To be able to get insight into the costs and benefits of thinking, and to identify 
the combinations of decision rules being used by decision makers, Payne (1976) 
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suggested that making inferences from behavior is not sufficient. Instead, he 
proposed that the study of acquisition and search of information should be 
emphasized as the prescribed research methods in the study of decision processes. 
In this respect, he was heavily influenced by models of human problem solving at 
that time (Newell & Simon, 1972). Another influence came from the development 
of the so-called information board technique. In a typical information-board 
experiment, matrices of alternatives by attributes are presented on a computer 
screen. Subjects are searching for information before stating their preference. 
The studies of Ericsson and Simon (1980, 1984) dealing with verbal reports as 
data provided a source of inspiration for the development of another widely used 
technique, the protocol analysis. The major objective in studies involving both 
information board and protocol analysis techniques has been to identify whether 
decision processes follow compensatory or non-compensatory strategies1 (see Ford 
et al. 1989, for a review). In fact the study of violations of the invariance principle, 
from the strategy identification point of view, has been one of the major issues. For 
instance, the effects of response mode on decision making strategies were 
investigated by Billings and Scherer (1988). They found that there were more 
information searched/ interdimensional processed in judgment response modes than 
in choice. They also found a more constant amount of information searched across 
alternatives in judgment than in choice. 
In their attempt to identify the strategies used in different response modes in 
risky contexts, Schkade and Johnson (1989) studied cognitive processes in 
preference reversal gambles. In the first two experiments, they analyzed pricing-
^Examples of compensatory decision rules or strategies are the additive utility and the additive 
difference rules. In these rules it is assumed that each dimension can be measured on an interval 
or ratio scale and be given a weight that corresponds to its importance. Each altemative is then 
evaluated by summing the weighted values on each dimension. In the additive difference rule the 
decision maker is assumed to evaluate the differences between the alternatives on a dimension by 
dimension basis, that is, the difference between the alternatives on each attribute is calculated and 
summed. The decision maker then choses the altemative with the greatest aggregated difference. 
Among the non-compensatory strategies, four can be identified as the most frequently studied: the 
conjunctive, disjunctive, lexicographic, and elimination-by-aspects (EBA) strategies. In the 
conjunctive strategy the decision maker defmes certain cut-off points or thresholds on the 
dimensions, and if an altemative on any dimension fails to reach any of these thresholds, it is 
rejected. A disjunctive model is on the other hand characterized by that a decision maker can 
accept a low score of an altemative on one dimension, provided that it has a high score on 
another dimension. In the lexicographic strategy, the decision maker makes an importance 
ordering of the dimensions, and then makes a choice on the basis of the most important 
dimension. The elimination-by-aspects (EBA) strategy is related to both the lexicographic and 
the conjunctive strategy. It is assumed in it that alternatives consist of a set of aspects, and that 
alternatives that do not exceed the required point is rejected, beginning with the most important 
dimension. All the "failing" aspects are eliminated dimension-wise, until there only is one 
surviving altemative. 
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choice and pricing-rating reversals. An important question was the role of 
anchoring and adjustment for the preference reversal effect. Attention to attributes 
and total time was used as dependent measures. The process analysis carried out in 
the first experiment (pricing-choice) revealed that pricing generally took longer 
time than choice. Another finding was that more attention was directed towards 
the pay-off information in pricing than in choice. Furthermore, less attention was 
directed towards the probability råtes in pricing than in choice. The process 
analysis carried out in the second experiment (pricing-rating) showed that the 
starting points were affected by the compatible gamble elements in both pricing 
and ratings. As a rational for this, the anchoring and adjustment principle was 
suggested. 
Westenberg and Koele (1990, 1992) investigated the influence of response 
modes on decision strategies. Their general hypothesis was that the type of 
response required in a decision situation influences which decision strategy is 
selected. In both their studies subjects to a higher extent were found to use 
compensatory strategies as a function of the increasing number of categories (or 
scale-points) in the decision situation. In line with Billings and Scherer (1988) 
qualitative response modes tended to induce more non-compensatory strategies 
than judgments. Furthermore, an interesting difference was found between the two 
qualitative response modes of selecting and rejecting. Both response modes were 
found to induce non-compensatory strategies, but compensatory strategies were 
more frequent in the rejection than in selection mode. 
This methodological approach was used in the present studies to validate one 
of the explanations of riskless preference reversals; the strategy compatibility 
hypothesis (Hypothesis Hj). Hence, the validity of the hypothesis will be tested 
with the use of both input and output data together with cognitive accounts in line 
with the information-search tradition (Russo, Johnson, & Stephens, 1989; Maule, 
1992; Westenberg, 1992). 
In conclusion, cost-benefit explanations of violations of invariance state that 
people have available or can generate different decision strategies for making 
choices or judgments. It is also assumed that the strategies differ in expected costs 
and benefits. To be able to select a strategy, the decision maker must take in to 
consideration the anticipated costs and benefits of each strategy, given the specific 
task environment. In this stream of research, process tracing is typically carried 
out with information board techniques or protocol analysis (see also Johnson et al., 
1988, for a review). 
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2.4 Restructuring theories 
In Dominance Structure Theory (DST) (Montgomery, 1983) it is argued that 
the most cost-effective way for people to resolve the conflict inherent in choices is 
to find a cognitive structure which yields dominance for one alternative. 
Dominance structuring is seen as a principle for facilitating the information 
processing in the decision situation. The main idea is that people try to structure 
and restructure their representation of a decision problem so that one alternative 
always appears to be the best. The decision process is hence seen as a search for a 
dominance structure, that is, as a cognitive process where all possible 
disadvantages of a promising alternative are eliminated or neutralized. This 
alternative then appears as the best one, since it can be maintained that it dominates 
the other ones. It is important to mention that if the decision maker fails to find a 
dominance structure for a promising alternative, it is always possible to return to 
the previous phase and carry on the search for dominance (see also Dahlstrand & 
Montgomery, 1989, Montgomery & Hemlin, 1991, Montgomery & Svenson, 1989 
for empirical tests of the theory). 
A more recent contribution is Differentiation and Consolidation Theory (DCT) 
(Svenson, 1992). In this theory, decision making is conceived of as a process in 
which one alternative gradually is differentiated from another until the degree of 
differentiation is enough for a decision. Thus, it is not sufficient to choose an 
alternative that is better. Rather, the preferred alternative should be so much better 
than the nonpreferred alternative that it remains better even under unfavorable 
post-decision conditions2 (see also Svenson & Benthorn, 1992, and Svenson & 
Malmsten, 1992, for empirical tests of the theory). However, the present studies 
are primarily based on the theoretical foundations of DST. 
The primary aim of DST is to describe how choices or decisions actually are 
made. To be able to understand how the theory can explain violations of 
invariance, such as the prominence effect reported by Tversky et al. (1988), it is 
motivated to parallel the different steps of one of these models with the steps 
prescribed by a theory dealing with judgments in detail (see Tables 1 and 2). As 
mentioned earlier, multi-attribute utility theory (MAUT) provides such an account. 
The reason for this is to give insight into (i) why choices are more unpredictable 
from linear weighting models than judgments, and (ii) why the predominant 
2Svenson (1992) actually postulates three types of structural differentiation modes or ways of 
changing the representation which all - at least in part - build on value and belief restructuring. 
The modes are labeled differentiation through attractiveness restructuring, differentiation 
through attribute importance restructuring, and differentiation through facts restructuring (see 
also Fishhoff, 1975, and Hogarth & Einhorn, 1985). 
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attribute looms larger in choice than in matching judgments. Among several 
attribute weighting models, the so-called direct weight elicitation method (DWT) 
(Edwards, 1977) was selected for this purpose, on the basis of its simplicity and 
theoretical soundness (see Borcherding, Schmeer, & Weber, 1993, for a review). 
Table 1. The phases of DST explaining choices. 
Pre-editing phase. All unnecessary attributes and alternatives are deleted from 
further processing. 
Finding a promising alternative phase. This phase implies that the decision maker 
detects an alternative with attractive attributes or at least an altemative with 
attributes that encourage great expectations of how such an altemative is supposed 
to be. 
The dominance testing phase. This is a sort of everyday sensitivity analysis in 
which the decision maker tests if there are any disadvantages connected to the 
promising alternative. If no disadvantages are found, the promising alternative is 
chosen. The test can be carried out more or less systematic, depending on the felt 
pressure to choose the promising alternative. 
The dominance structuring phase. This phase aims at "repairing" the deviations 
from dominance which have been localized in the previous phase. This aim can be 
completed by using different kinds of operations, such as bolstering of the 
advantages or de-emphasizing of the disadvantages of the promising alternative. 
But two other operations, cancellation or collapsing may also be used. Cancellation 
implies that the decision maker makes trade-offs between advantages and 
disadvantages of the alternative. This operation is often used when there exists a 
natural connection between an advantage and a disadvantage. Collapsing on the 
other hand implies that two or more attributes are collapsed into a superior 
attribute, which often is more comprehensive (see also Huber, 1989). 
The search for a dominance structure is according to Montgomery (1983) 
supposed to go through four phases, that is pre-editing, finding a promising 
alternative, dominance testing, and dominance structuring. Edwards (1977) also 
presents four phases in his model, that is structuring the problem, determining the 
importance of dimensions, measuring alternatives on the dimensions, and choice. 
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Attempts have been made to test DST as a psychological account of violations 
of procedure invariance. Lindberg, Gärling, and Montgomery (1989), found it 
plausible that dominance structuring could be the answer to the worse fit of the 
predictions of multi-attribute utility theory (MAUT) to choices than to preference 
ratings. 
Table 2. The Phases of DWT explaining judgments 
Structuring the problem phase. This phase includes the following four steps: (1) 
The decision maker(s) is identified. (2) The decision is identified. (3) The 
alternatives to be evaluated are identified. (4) The dimensions on which the 
alternatives are to be evaluated are identified. 
Determining the importance of dimensions phase. This phase includes the 
following three steps: (1) The dimensions are rank-ordered in terms of their 
importance. (2) The rankings are translated into ratings. (3) The ratings are 
converted to numbers that sum to 1. 
Measuring alternatives on the dimensions phase. This phase includes the 
following two steps: (1) The alternatives are measured on each of the dimensions. 
(2) The overall worth of each alternative is calculated by summing each 
alternativens scores on the dimensions which were weighted earlier. 
Choice phase. The previous phase yields a list of alternatives accompanied by their 
measures of relative worth. The normative rule is to choose the alternative with the 
largest assessment of worth. 
As described earlier, the decision maker is according to the theory assumed to 
modify his or her beliefs/evaluations related to attributes and attribute levels in 
such a way that a favored alternative stånds out as dominant. Lindberg et al. 
(1989) thus argued that such changes in belief-value structures in the choice 
process should make the outcome of the choice difficult to predict based on 
previously performed belief evaluations as input data for the multiattribute utility 
predictions. The results were in line with an interpretation which favored the idea 
of simplifying heuristics used in the dominance structuring of the choice task. 
These heuristics were not used in the judgment task which led to the better fit. 
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As noted above, Tversky et al. (1990) and Slovic et al. (1988) demonstrated a 
judgment-choice discrepancy in the form of a riskless preference reversal in the 
case where one of the ättributes were selected to be predominant or prominent. In 
choice tasks subjects placed more weight on this attribute than they did in 
matching tasks in which they were required to make the two options equally 
attractive. The phenomenon was termed the prominence effect. The rational 
provided was that the effect occurs because choice and matching tasks evoke 
different types of decision strategies giving different weight to the prominent 
attribute. The qualitative response in choice is regarded as compatible with a 
qualitative decision rule which renders quantitative weighting of ättributes 
unnecessary. In contrast, quantitative judgments are compatible with a quantitative 
weighting rule. 
If there are one prominent and one nonprominent attribute, as a result of the 
restructuring process the former will have more influence since the differences on 
that attribute are enlarged relative to the other. More precisely, subjects may 
modify their beliefs or values in such a way that there will be a larger discrepancy 
between the options on the more important attribute than on the less important 
attribute. Both the importance order of the ättributes and the differences between 
the alternatives on the ättributes will then speak in favour of a preference in line 
with the prominent attribute. The above mentioned modifications of beliefs or 
values are thought to take place primarily in choice which is characterized by an 
ability to resolve conflicts between alternatives. It is assumed that reasons or 
motives guide the modifications of values and beliefs. Therefore, Montgomery 
(1983, 1989) assumed that the importance of a decision is directly related to the 
degree of restructuring. 
A hypothesis (Hj) which will be tested in the studies is that the prominence 
effect can be explained by Montgomery's (1983, 1989) theory of dominance 
structuring in decision making. It will be referred to as the value-belief 
restructuring hypothesis (or sometimes just the restructuring hypothesis). 
Another perspective on restructuring is taken by Payne, Bettman, Coupey, and 
Johnson (1992). They suggest that one very important analytic tool for the 
understanding of the contingency of preferences on task demands is the 
restructuring of the input data. According to Payne et al. (1992) restructuring is 
thought to occur in the editing phase, which is earlier than what Montgomery 
(1983) suggested. Examples of restructuring operations are information 
transformations (e.g., rounding off, standardizing, or performing calculations), 
rearranging information (e.g., changing the order of the alternatives or ättributes) 
or eliminating information (see also Russo, 1977, and Ranyard, 1989). The aim of 
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restructuring seems to be to make problems more manageable. With the help of 
transforming, rearranging, or eliminating information, the decision maker can use a 
processing strategy and obtain an acceptable amount of accuracy and cognitive 
effort in the task situation. That same strategy could have been too difficult to use 
before restructuring. A mode of differentiation proposed by Svenson (1992) in 
DCT encompasses this mechanism3. 
The choice problems used by Payne et al. (1992) were either well-structured or 
poorly structured and information was presented either simultaneously or 
sequentially. The characteristics of a well-structured problem was that all 
information for an attribute was expressed in the same units, and information was 
presented in the same order within each alternative for any given attribute. Poorly 
structured problems were characterized by the fact that the information within the 
same attribute had different units, and that the information could appear in a 
different order within each alternative for any given attribute. Payne et al. (1992) 
let subjects take notes while processing, and those verbal protocols were then 
coded with respect to specific restructuring operations. These operations were 
used by the subjects to create different forms of helpful matrices in the poorly 
structured problems. To arrive at matrix representations, subjects used 
transformations, calculations, and rearranging operations. Subjects who made 
notes were then compared with others who did not It was found that subjects who 
restructured (in the sense that they made notes) to a higher extent were using 
alternative-based strategies when processing the restructured material. The 
conclusion reached by Payne et al. (1992) was that subjects use restructuring as a 
means of mental effort investment to be able to låter use a more accurate strategy 
with a reasonable amount of effort. They found that restructuring takes place in the 
early stages of the decision process, but this finding might be due to an artifact 
produced by the methodology of taking notes. Hence, restructuring is thought to 
3 In Differentiation and Consolodition Theory (Svenson, 1992), the fourth mode of differentiation 
is based on heuristics taking place in the editing phase. Differentiation through decision problem 
restructuring implies that real life decisions can be more or less well-defined, as stated earlier. In 
the latter case people might want to create decision alternatives all by themselves, due to for 
instance perceived uncertainty, task complexity, or social conflict. Svenson (1992) illustrates this 
with a decision between manufacturers of prefabricated homes. A decision like this may involve 
much mental effort in composing alternatives from the different manufacturers, due to task 
complexity. Uncertainty may as well lead to decision problem restructuring. New and unfamiliar 
decision situations are therefore often difficult to differentiate on the alternative level. In 
situations like this, people often import a new reference alternative without seriously considering 
it in the decision situation. This might lead to an increased differentiation on the process level 
(see also Payne, 1982; Shafir, Simonson, & Tversky, 1993; Tyszka, 1983; and Wedell, 1991). 
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have the ability of occurring at any time in the decision process, although it mostly 
occurs in the early stages. 
Instead of compatibility between qualitative/quantitative response mode and 
decision rule (Tversky et al. 1988), it rrtay be assumed that the required output 
from subjects needs to be compatible with the structure of information in input. In 
a matching task there is an agreement between input and the required output. 
Subjects are required to match one value difference (required output) to another 
difference which is given in the task (input). Hence, there exists a dimensional 
compatibility between input and output. If the difference between attribute levels of 
the prominent attribute serves as input, then the difference between the levels on 
the nonprominent attribute serves as the required output, and vice versa. This form 
of compatibility involves transforming and rearranging of the information by 
subjects in the editing phase, since both differences always have to be taken into 
consideration. 
In choices and preference ratings on the other hand, both differences serve as 
input. For example, in a two alternatives x two attributes choice task the input Ls 
built on four pieces of information (the attribute levels of each alternative), 
whereas the output corresponds to a preference order between alternatives. Here, 
there is no dimensional compatibility between input and output. Subjects therefore 
do not transform and rearrange the information to the same extent, simply because 
they are not forced to do it. The information structure of these tasks gives them the 
opportunity to select a lexicographic strategy. 
Hence, whereas choice as a qualitative response mode is distinguished from 
judgments, the idea is offered that matching judgments can be seen as distinct from 
preference ratings and choices in that subjects have to evaluate one value 
difference relative to another to carry out the task. On the basis of this reasoning, a 
prominence effect is also expectéd for preference ratings, due to the assumption 
that information structure compatibility is salient for the selection of strategy. The 
crucial fact for the strategy being used is the dimensional compatibility between the 
input and output and not (primarily) the metric levels of the same. 
The hypothesis (H3) that restructuring in the editing phase can explain the 
prominence effect is investigated in the present studies. It is henceforth referred to 
as the structure compatibility hypothesis. 
There are probably connections between restructuring in the editing phase and 
value-belief restructuring. Henceforth, it is generally assumed that the information 
structure in input of different response modes in terms of presentation mode of the 
alternatives (sequential, simultaneous) has an effect on the belief-value 
restructuring låter to come. Therefore, it is assumed that if the information 
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structure is characterized by sequential presentation ofalternatives, this will lead to 
a decrease in value-belief restructuring, and a reduction of the prominence effect. 
If, on the other hand, the information structure is characterized by simultaneous 
presentation of alternatives, then this will lead to an increase of the value-belief 
restructuring, and to an enhanced prominence effect (see also Birnbaum, 1992). 
To conclude, in cognitive restructuring theories, violations of the procedure 
invariance principle is interpreted as resulting from constructive processing in 
choice. In the phase of restructuring a tentatively promising alternative is 
differentiated from another/others. Because of this the prominent attribute looms 
larger in choice than in other response modes, for instance in judgments. The 
prominence effect in choice is therefore assumed to be acquired by different forms 
of restructuring operations in which changes of the representations take place. 
Researchers which adopt this perspective challenge the view that human choice is 
cognitively deficient4. Different arguments can be used in support of this 
standpoint. First, it can be argued that an important parameter has been neglected 
which is the cost of a decision strategy. Second, decisions must be viewed as parts 
of a continuous constructive process. They are nevertheless often seen as discrete 
events. Third, it is argued that very little attention has been given to the internal 
structural representation of the problem. A central issue in all three arguments is 
what conditions humans reveal in which kind of behavior. The issue of human 
behavioral efficiency from a general point of view is thus of less interest. 
4 Montgomery (1989) concludes that especially the operations of bolstering of advantages and de-
emphasizing of disadvantages of a promising alternative are activities that may lead to what 
might be termed irrational decisions. Nevertheless, he makes clear that such outcomes are not to 
be regarded as biased decisions. When dominance structuring leads to violations of inv<iriance it 
must be viewed as a rational output in the sense that the output is a result of minimization of 
cognitive Costs. On the other hand it is also rational, and - prescriptively better, to use the 
operations of cancellation and collapsing (Watson, 1992). This is due to that the latter operations 
are more in line with reality. 
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3.0 Summary of the Empirical Studies 
3.1 Study I: Preference judgments and choice: Is the prominence effect due to 
information integration or information evaluation? (Montgomery, Gärling, 
Lindberg, and Selart, 1990). 
In this study the question was addressed whether the prominence effect found 
by Tversky et al. (1988) would remain if the judgment procedure they used would 
bereplaced by another. Tversky et al. (1988) operationalized preference judgments 
in terms of a matching procedure in which the decision maker adjusted one option 
to another. 
The judgment mode selected was preference rating, which is a more direct way 
of eliciting preferences than matching, involving overall judgments of single 
options. As was the case in the Tversky et al. (1988) study subjects were presented 
with a set of choice problems with two altematives described by two attributes 
which differed in importance. Based on the explanation of the judgment-choice 
discrepancy provided by Tversky et al. (1988), it was assumed that choices more 
oftén would follow the more important attribute than preference ratings. Provided 
this held true, two explanations were put forward as accounts for the differential 
predictability of choices and preference ratings, value-belief restructuring and 
strategy compatibility. The value-belief restructuring hypothesis implies that choice 
subjects are supposed to evaluate the information about the options differently than 
what subjects do in preference ratings. On a more concrete level, the assumption 
was made that subjects in choice modify their beliefs or values in such a way that a 
larger discrepancy will occur between the altematives on the more important 
attribute. This notion was in line with the notion that making a choice requires 
more commitment and involves more conflict which may create a higher pressure 
to find consistent support for choices than for preference ratings (cf. Abelson & 
Levy, 1985). 
The strategy compatibility hypothesis is based on the notion that subjects in 
choice and in preference ratings differ in how they integrate the information. In 
other words, differences may occur which can be attributed to the way subjects 
select and weight the information in the two response modes. This explanation 
would be in line with the contingent weighting approach of Tversky et al. (1988) 
which states that subjects in choice are supposed to follow a lexicographic decision 
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rule. If such is the case, value and belief modifications would be unnecessary, since 
the conflict would be reduced. 
To test these explanations, before eliciting their preferences, subjects were 
asked to evaluate the attribute levels one by one on a rating scale. The implication 
was that if the prominence effect covaried with these evaluations, it would support 
the idea of value-belief restructuring. If, on the other hand, the prominence effect 
was not followed by any concomitant variation in the evaluations of attribute levels 
across the two response modes, the strategy compatibility explanation would gain 
support. 
The selection of attribute levels for the main experiment was made in a pilot 
study. A matching procedure was used which was identical to the one applied by 
Tversky et al. (1988). Subjects' task was to find combinations of attribute levels 
which rendered the two alternatives in each problem equally attractive. 
In the main experiment one choice condition and two preference rating 
conditions were employed. Three parallel versions of a booklet were distributed to 
the subjects. In all conditions subjects were instructed to rate each attribute level 
with respect to the extent it facilitated or counteracted their goal in the decision 
situation. Attribute level ratings were hence made on a scale with positive and 
negative end-points. In the choice condition, the two alternatives of each problem 
were presented simultaneously on the same page. Subjects' task was to rate the 
attribute levels and subsequently choose one of the two options of each situation. 
One of the preference rating conditions was designed to be similar in its structure 
to the choice task. The alternatives were for this condition presented on the same 
page. In the other preference rating condition, each alternative was presented 
sequentially on a separate page. 
The response scores from the choices and preference ratings were made 
comparable by the use of similar scoring procedures. A prominence effect for 
choice was detected, indicating that the attributes which were selected to be 
prominent loomed larger in choice than in the two rating modes. It was further 
shown that a reliable judgment-choice discrepancy only existed between choice and 
sequentially presented preference ratings. 
The differences between ratings on the prominent attribute were greater for the 
choice and the pairwise preference ratings than for separate preference ratings. On 
the nonprominent attribute they were greatest for same-page preference ratings and 
lowest for separate preference ratings. Finally, it was shown that the response 
scores were not reliably related to response condition independently of the attribute 
level ratings. 
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The results were interpreted in line with the value-belief restructuring 
hypothesis, since the prominence effect was produced because subjects interpreted 
and evaluated the given information differently when they were choosing between 
the alternatives than when they were rating them. The strategy compatibility 
hypothesis did not receive empirical support, since the prominence effect could not 
be explained in terms of simplifying heuristics used in choice. However, 
incongruent with both the value-belief restructuring and strategy compatibility, a 
significant difference between choices and preference ratings was not found when 
the latter were made of simultaneously presented options. 
3.2 Study H: The judgment-choice discrepancy: Noncompatibility or 
restructuring? (Montgomery, Selart, Gärling, and Lindberg, 1994). 
In Study II different groups of subjects performed (1) only preference ratings 
or choices, (2) preference ratings or choices preceded by attractiveness ratings of 
the aspects on a rating scale, and (3) preference ratings or choices accompanied by 
think-aloud reports. Both subjects who made choices and subjects who made 
preference ratings were presented with options simultaneously. The number of 
options was increased from two to four with the aim of discouraging subjects in 
the preference-judgments condition to make implicit choices. In constructing the 
choice options, attribute levels were selected in a pilot study. Only two options 
were however included. Pairs of options were made equally attractive and were 
considered to be the main candidates or target options for subjects' choices. On the 
basis of these options, two prescriptively less important filler options were 
constructed for each problem to be included in the main experiment. Study II 
differed from Study I in that think-aloud data were collected. Hence, inferences 
could be made about how subjects attended to and evaluated attributes and 
attribute levels (Montgomery & Svenson, 1989). 
The response scores from the choices and preference ratings were in all 
conditions made comparable by the use of similar scoring procedures. A 
prominence effect was thus obtained. However, significant effects involving 
response mode were not found. This implied that the prominence effect was not 
different for preference judgments and choices. Furthermore, since no main effect 
or interaction effect involving method reached significance, this would implicate no 
important interfering effects of attractiveness judgments of attribute levels and 
think-aloud reports. 
Previous studies of restructuring of choice problems (Dahlstrand & 
Montgomery, 1984; Montgomery & Svenson, 1989) have shown that amount of 
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attention to and positive evaluation of an option depends on whether it is finally 
chosen or not. A highly significant main effect of preferred/nonpreferred target 
option was obtained, reflecting subjects' tendency to judge as more attractive the 
attribute levels of the target options which were more often preferred. Thus, 
subjects' judgments of attractiveness of attribute levels were consistent with their 
preference judgments and choices. In addition, response mode was involved in a 
weak higher-order interaction with preferred/non-preferred target option, 
prominent/nonprominent target option, and attribute, However, this interaction 
effect did not suggest more restructuring for choices than for preference 
judgments. 
The processing of the think-aloud reports followed a procedure which has 
been developed in previous research (e. g., Montgomery & Svenson, 1989; 
Svenson, 1989). On the basis of the coded results, two indices of information 
processing were computed reflecting the attention and evaluation of information. 
The attention index indicated that more attention was paid to the attributes in the 
preference-ratings condition than in the choice condition. On the evaluation index, 
the prominent attribute received a significant higher value than the nonprominent 
attribute. A significant main effect of response mode on the attention index was 
found. Target options received about half as much attention in choices as in 
preference ratings. Moreover, in choices the preferred target option drew more 
attention than the nonpreferred target option while the reverse was true in 
preference ratings. Evaluations were less positive in choices than in preference 
ratings. However, this difference was limited to nonpreferred target options. Thus, 
in support of the existence of restructuring of the choice options, the difference in 
degree of positive evaluation was larger between preferred and nonpreferred target 
options when subjects made choices than when they performed preference ratings. 
The results thus replicated the prominence effect in showing that choices 
were more often made of the option with the highest value on the predominant or 
prominent attribute. However, a prominence effect was also demonstrated for 
preference ratings. 
The prominence effect observed for preference ratings seems to rule out the 
strategy compatibility hypothesis as the sole explanation. It was undeniable that 
the response was more quantitative in preference judgments than in choices, but 
subjects nevertheless showed an equally strong tendency to attend to the prominent 
attribute. The same conclusion was reached by Westenberg and Koele (1992) on 
the basis of their finding that the prominence effect for different response modes 
was unaffected by the number of possible attribute levels. 
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However, the value-belief restructuring account did not fare better. The 
think-aloud protocols supported the assumption that subjects changed their values 
and beliefs when making choices. Such restructuring was also observed more 
frequently for choices than for preference ratings. Only in the case of choices was 
the observed value-belief restructuring accompanied by a prominence effect. Since 
a prominence effect was also obtained for the preference ratings, this form of 
restructuring could not be a sufficient explanation. When assessing the validity of 
the value-belief restructuring hypothesis, it should be noted that the judgments of 
attractiveness of the attribute levels did not clearly indicate that this form of 
restructuring was more frequent in the choice than in the preference-rating 
conditions. However, when performing the attractiveness judgments, subjects were 
perhaps influenced by the numerical attribute levels to the extent that they did not 
change their judgments much even though a change was experienced. In the think-
aloud reports where subjects did not make any attractiveness judgments, such an 
influence was probably minimized. 
The results of the study indicated that information was processed differently 
when subjects made preference ratings than when they made choices. Less 
attention was given to the target options in choices than in preference ratings 
which as an isolated finding indicate that subjects attended to fewer aspects 
(Lindberg et al., 1989). As suggested by the think-aloud protocols, in choices 
subjects furthermore differentiated the options more on the prominent attribute and 
less on the nonprominent attribute. No difference was found between choice and 
preference ratings with respect to how attractive the attributes were perceived. 
A more general form of the compatibility hypothesis was therefore suggested in 
line with editing-phase restructuring. Whereas the choice task is different from 
both the matehing and preference-rating tasks in being qualitative rather than 
quantitative, preference ratings are different from matehing in calling for judgments 
of single options rather than matehing one value difference to another. Thus, one 
may expect a prominence effect for preference ratings although it is not possible to 
predict how strong it will be relative to that for choice. 
In summary, preference ratings appeared to be almost equally susceptible to the 
prominence effect as choices are. The strueture compatibility hypothesis which was 
offered was therefore suggested to better explain the prominence effect than the 
value-belief restructuring explanation, even though, as the present results showed, 
value-belief restructuring was part of the process leading to a choice. 
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3.3 Study IH: Violations of procedure invariance in preference measurement: 
Cognitive explanations (Selart, Montgomery, Romanus, and Gärling, 1994). 
In the first experiment of Study III the value-belief restructuring hypothesis was 
tested as follows. It was argued that if value-belief restructuring explains the 
prominence effect, a factor which increases this restructuring should be expected to 
also increase the prominence effect. A decision may be more important if the 
consequences have personal relevance. Hence, two different sets of pairs of choice 
options were constructed. One set consisted of options which were framed as 
personally relevant, the other set consisted of options which were not directly 
personally relevant. The higher degree of personal relevance was expected to 
increase value-belief restructuring. In contrast, no difference was predicted from 
the strategy compatibility hypothesis. Different groups of subjects who either made 
choices or performed preference ratings were given the different sets of choice 
options. Think-aloud protocols were obtained as a means of assessing the degree 
of value-belief restructuring. 
According to the strategy compatibility hypothesis more attention was supposed 
to be given to the prominent attribute in choice than in preference ratings. 
Furthermore, a prominence effect should only occur in choice. 
In line with the editing-phase restructuring hypothesis, sequential presentation 
of alternatives was likely to reduce value and belief restructuring. The question was 
therefore raised whether a weaker prominence effect would be obtained also for 
choices if options were presented sequentially. Personal relevance was not 
supposed to make a difference. 
Attribute levels were selected on the basis of the results of a pilot study. 
Subjects' task was to make the alternatives of each pair equally attractive. One 
third of the subjects made choices of options presented pairwise on separate pages 
in a booklet. Another third accepted or rejected options which were presented 
singly. A final third of the subjects performed preference ratings of singly presented 
options. 
Preference" ratings, choices between options, and choices to accept were scored 
equivalently. A prominence effect was uniformly obtained. The prominence effect 
was reliably smaller for personally relevant problems and reliably larger for choices 
to accept. For the personally relevant problems, the prominence effect was 
furthermore reliably smaller for choices between options than for the other 
response modes. For the personally less relevant problems, the prominence effect 
was reliably larger for choices between options than for the other response modes. 
33 
Whether choices between options were construed as personally relevant or not 
did thus not seem to have an unequivocal effect. As predicted from the value-belief 
restructuring hypothesis, personally relevant problems affected the prominence 
effect for choices and choices to accept but did not affect the prominence effect for 
preference ratings. However, the effect was in the expected direction only for 
choices to accept. In addition, the think-aloud protocols did not indicate that 
personal relevance increased value-belief restructuring. 
Evidence for value-belief restructuring preceding choices between options was 
obtained in that the difference between the evaluations of preferred and 
nonpreferred options were larger for choices between options than for preference 
ratings. However, choices to accept did not differ from preference ratings. A 
characteristic of the think-aloud data appeared to be that sequential presentation 
led to positive evaluations of both levels of the prominent attribute and negative 
evaluations of both levels of the nonprominent attribute. More comparisons were 
thus made when both options were available simultaneously. 
Against the strategy compatibility hypothesis spöke that, in the think-aloud 
protocols, more attention was not given to the prominent attribute. The strategy 
compatibility hypothesis was also contradicted by the fact that an equally strong 
prominence effect was obtained for choices and preference ratings. This was in line 
with the results of Studies I and II. 
A simultaneous presentation mode did not increase the prominence effect, 
which contradicted the editing-phase restructuring hypothesis. 
In the second experiment of Study III the question was raised whether a 
prominence effect would also be obtained if the same subjects performed the 
matehing task, either on the same or on a different occasion as they performed the 
choice or preference-rating task. If both tasks are performed on the same occasion, 
this may decrease the prominence effect for choices, according to the structure 
compatibility hypothesis. It may also decrease the prominence effect for preference 
ratings when alternatives are presented simultaneously, due to the similarity in 
information structure to the choice condition. 
Furthermore, since performance of the matehing task on the same or a different 
occasion does not affect strategy compatibility, no difference in prominence effect 
was expected on the basis of the strategy compatibility hypothesis. 
The choices and preference ratings were scored as in the preceding experiment. 
A prominence effect was obtained in each condition. As expected from the 
structure compatibility hypothesis, the prominence effect was reduced when 
subjects performed the matehing task in the same session. However, neither the 
main effect of session nor its interaction with response mode reached significance. 
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In both experiments the prominence effect was replicated. Although the options 
were matched to be equally attractive, the option with the highest value on the 
prominent attribute was more often chosen. This held true irrespectively of 
whether the same or different subjects performed the matching task, whether the 
same subjects performed the matching task in the same or in a different session, or 
whether the missing values were the same or varied. Consistent with previous 
findings (Fischer & Hawkins, 1993), a prominence effect was also observed for 
preference ratings. In the first experiment a prominence effect was similarly found 
for choices to accept an option. Thus, the results corroborated the generality of the 
prominence effect. At the same time they questioned the explanations of the effect 
which have been offered. 
Unless there was some other explanation of the prominence effect for preference 
ratings, observing such an effect was not in agreement with the strategy 
compatibility hypothesis. This hypothesis only predicts a prominence effect for 
choices. In addition, the think-aloud protocols did not indicate that subjects 
attended more to the prominent attribute as the hypothesis impiies they would. 
However, the value-belief restructuring hypothesis was also again contradicted. 
The think-aloud protocols in the first experiment supported the assumption that 
subjects' value-belief restructuring was more frequent in the choice problems in 
connection with choices between options than for preference ratings of sequentially 
presented options. In disagreement with the hypothesis, value-belief restructuring 
was however not more frequent for choices to accept than for preference ratings. 
Furthermore, only in the case of choices between options was the observed 
restructuring accompanied by a prominence effect. Since a prominence effect was 
obtained for the preference ratings and choices to accept, value-belief restructuring 
cannot be a sufficient explanation. The protocols further revealed that construing 
the problems in the first experiment as personally relevant did not lead to more 
value-belief restructuring. 
Disregarding an effect in the unpredicted direction confmed to choices between 
options, the results were consistent with the structure compatibility hypothesis. 
Yet, in disagreement with the hypothesis, a prominence effect was observed in the 
first experiment for choices to accept an option. Also in disagreement with the 
hypothesis, in the second experiment a prominence effect was found when subjects 
simultaneously performed the matching task. Still, the prominence effect tended to 
be weaker in this condition as compared to a condition when the matching task 
was performed in a different session. 
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3.4 Study IV: Can accountability and value differences modify the prominence 
effect in judgment and choice? (Selart, 1994). 
In the first experiment of Study IV a matching procedure was used to provide 
the stimulus material for the following two experiments. Subjects task was to make 
the pairs of alternatives equally attractive. In the second and third experiments, 
preferences for the alternatives were elicited with choices and preference ratings. 
Two partly different manipulations of accountability were used in these 
experiments (Tetlock, 1983; Simonson & Nye, 1992). The value difference within 
attributes was also varied. 
The analyses of the results of the matching experiment rested on the assumption 
that the attractiveness of the levels of the prominent and nonprominent attributes 
for the prominent option (with the highest value on the prominent attribute) were 
equal to the corresponding attractiveness of the levels of the prominent and 
nonprominent attributes for the nonprominent option. The mean weight ratios of 
the attributes indicated that effectiveness was a more important attribute than pain-
relief. No reliable interaction between matching condition and value difference was 
found. On average no change with value difference was observed. The 
construction of the stimuli for the following experiments was accordingly based on 
the overall mean weight ratio. 
In the second experiment pairs of descriptions of medical treatments were 
constructed as follows. In one set of pairs the numerical value differences on the 
prominent attribute were small, in another set they were large. A numerical value 
difference on the nonprominent attribute was for each treatment pair obtained by 
first multiplying the value difference on the prominent attribute with the mean 
weight ratio obtained from the matching task in the first experiment. The resulting 
numerical value difference was then slightly increased to make the nonprominent 
option appear more attractive than the prominent option, in line with the procedure 
in Tversky et al. (1988). 
Preferences were elicited with choices and preference ratings. The descriptions 
were presented pairwise in the preference-rating condition like they were in the 
choice condition. 
The degree of accountability was manipulated through task instructions in a way 
similar to that in previous studies. In the low accountability condition, subjects 
were told that all of their responses would remain totally confidential. In contrast, 
subjects were told in the high-accountability condition that the material they 
provided by their responses would be included in a booklet and subject to future 
class discussions. They were therefore told to explain and justify their judgments or 
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choices. After having completed all choices/ratings, subjects were allowed to 
review their responses and then write down their explanations and justifications. 
Without having been told in advance, subjects in the low-accountability condition 
were asked to do the same. 
To further test the value-belief restructuring hypothesis it was proposed that 
accountability would increase this form of restructuring in choice. This was 
because justifying reasons for a choice should influence modifications of values and 
beliefs. Hence, a larger prominence effect was predicted for choices of high 
accountability than for those of low accountability. This manipulation was however 
supposed neither to increase nor decrease the prominence effect according to the 
competing hypotheses based on strategy compatibility and structure compatibility, 
respectively. 
In addition, the value-belief restructuring hypothesis was tested by varying the 
numerical value differences between the options. Small numerical value differences 
were assumed to result in an increase of the effect in choices, based on 
enhancement of value-belief restructuring. The rational behind this suggestion was 
that value-belief restructuring could be regarded as a "mental tie-breaking 
procedure" which was more likely to be set in action if options are closer in 
attribute values. 
According to the structure compatibility hypothesis small numerical value 
differences were like in the matching situation supposed to decrease the effect in 
both choice and preference rating, whereas large differences should increase it 
In line with the strategy compatibility explanation it was implied that the 
response mode should prime the strategy selection independently of the magnitudes 
on the quantitative input side. Therefore, such a manipulation was not supposed to 
influence the prominence effect in any direction. 
Choices and preference ratings were scored equivalently. A prominence effect 
was uniformly obtained. Some differences in the strength of the prominence effect 
were however evident. The prominence effect was reliably weaker when the 
numerical value difference was small than when it was large. In addition, the 
interaction with response mode was significant. Numerical value difference had 
little impact on the prominence effect in choice but affected the strength of the 
effect in preference ratings. There was no main effect of accountability. 
Furthermore, the interaction between response mode and accountability did not 
reach significance. 
The written justifications and explanations were coded similarly as think-aloud 
data in the previous studies. Only value-belief restructuring through attribute 
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importance could be analysed. However, there were no effects of response mode in 
these analyses. 
In summary, there was no clear evidence for an effect of accountability on the 
prominence effect. It may be the case that the accountability manipulation was to o 
weak. Therefore another kind of accountability manipulation was used in a third 
experiment in which the stimuli consisted of a subset of those used in the second 
experiment. The procedure was identical to that in the second experiment except 
that accountability was manipulated in a slightly different way. In contrast to the 
second experiment subjects in the high accountability condition were asked to 
explain and justify in a written statement each choice or pair of preference rarings 
immediately after every elicitation. No explanations/justifications were required 
from subjects in the low-accountability condition. The predictions of the three 
hypothesis as well as the scoring procedures were essentially the same as in the 
second experiment. 
A prominence effect was again uniformly obtained. Like in the second 
experiment it was reliably smaller when the numerical value difference was small 
than when it was large. However, neither the main nor the interaction effect of 
accountability reached significance. The justifications and explanation were coded 
and analyzed in the same manner as in the second experiment There were no 
effects of response mode in this experiment. 
The results of the experiments provided further evidence for the prominence 
effect. The strength of the effect was revealed in that the attempts to decrease 
preferences in line with the effect proved to be unsuccessful. Subjects still 
preferred the option with the highest value on the prominent attribute. As revealed 
by previous research, a prominence effect was found also for preference rarings. 
This finding supported the notion of the generality of the effect, and suggested that 
compatibility between input and output information could not alone account for the 
effect 
The value-belief restructuring hypothesis led to three predictions. First, it 
predicted a larger prominence effect for choices of high accountability than for 
those of low accountability. However, the accountability manipulation did not 
reach significance in any of the experiments. Second, it predicted that small 
numerical value differences should result in an increase of the prominence effect. 
The results suggested the reverse in both the second and the third experiment 
Thus, the prediction that a small numerical value difference would produce value-
belief restructuring and create a "mental tie-breaking procedure" lacked empirical 
support. 
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Third, it was predicted that this form of restructuring in justification and 
explanations should be more enhanced in choice than in preference ratings. 
However, no reliable effects due to response mode was found in any of these 
analyses. 
The structure compatibility hypothesis made two predictions. First, it predicted 
that accountability was supposed neither to increase nor decrease the effect in 
choice. In line with the prediction, no reliable main effects of accountability was 
detected in the experiments. Second, it predicted that small numerical value 
differences should decrease the effect in both choice and preference ratings 
whereas large such differences should increase it in both response modes. As 
suggested by the hypothesis, reliable main effects of numerical value difference in 
the predicted direction were generally obtained. Therefore, it seemed plausible to 
assume that the obtained results due to numerical value difference could be 
attributed to the same kind of information organization principle in choice as in 
preference ratings. 
Apart from the general claim that the responses in choices should differ from 
those in preference ratings, the strategy compatibility hypothesis made two 
predictions. First, accountability was supposed neither to increase nor decrease the 
prominence effect. The prediction was confirmed. Second, numerical value 
difference was not supposed to influence the prominence effect in any direction. 
This prediction turned out to be false. The results instead pointed towards that 
both response mode and variations in the stimulus material primed the strategy 
being used. 
The generality of the prominence effect was once again demonstrated. In 
addition to a number of other factors it was shown that numerical value difference 
modified the effect. When considering the different explanations of the prominence 
effect, the structure compatibility explanation appeared to be the most capable in 
accounting for these. The explanation pointed to the possibility that variations in 
the stimulus material has the ability to prime the strategy being used. 
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4.0 General Discussion and Conclusions 
Three cognitive accounts of why the invariance principle of decision theory was 
violated by the prominence effect were tested in a series of studies. These 
explanations were the strategy compatibility hypothesis, the value-belief 
restructuring hypothesis, and the editing-phase restructuring hypothesis. 
The strategy compatibility hypothesis claimed that the prominent or 
predominant attribute looms larger in choice than in judgment because choice and 
matching tasks evokes different types of decision strategies giving different weight 
to the prominent attribute (Tversky et al. 1988; Fischer & Hawkins, 1993; 
Hawkins 1994). The qualitative response in choice is viewed as compatible with a 
qualitative decision rule which renders quantitative weighting of attributes 
unnecessary. In contrast, quantitative judgments are compatible with a quantitative 
weighting rule. The cognitive basis of this suggestion is twofold. First, 
noncompatibility is regarded as requiring additional mental operations which 
subjects avoid. Second, a response mode is seen as priming the focus of attention 
on the compatible features of the input. 
The value-belief restructuring hypothesis stated that if there are one prominent 
and one nonprominent attribute, as a result of a restructuring process the former 
wi.ll have more influence since the differences on that attribute are enlarged relative 
to the other. More precisely, subjects may modify their values or beliefs in such a 
way that there will be a larger discrepancy between the options on the more 
important attribute than on the less important attribute. Both the importance order 
of the attributes and the differences between the altematives on the attributes will 
then speak in favour of a preference in line with the prominent attribute. The above 
mentioned modifications of beliefs or values were thought to take place in choice 
which is characterized by a conflict between altematives. It was assumed that 
reasons or motives guide the modifications of values and beliefs. 
According to the structure compatibility hypothesis, it was assumed that the 
required output from subjects needs to be compatible with the structure of 
information in input. Whereas choice as a qualitative response mode is 
distinguished from judgments, matching judgments can be seen as distinct from 
preference ratings and choices in that subjects have to evaluate one value 
difference relative to another to carry out the task. On the basis of this reasoning, a 
prominence effect is also expected for preference ratings, due to the assumption 
that information structure compatibility is salient for the selection of strategy. 
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Furthermore, the hypothesis assumed that the presentation mode of the alternatives 
(sequential, simultaneous) in choice and preference rating tasks has an effect on the 
value-belief restructuring låter to come. Therefore, it was assumed that if the 
information structure is characterized by sequential presentation of alternatives, 
this will lead to a decrease in value-belief restructuring, and a reduction of the 
prominence effect. If, on the other hand, the information structure is characterized 
by simultaneous presentation of alternatives, then this will lead to an increase of the 
value-belief restructuring, and to an emphasize of the prominence effect (see also 
Birnbaum, 1992). 
In Study I the results were interpreted in line with the value-belief restructuring 
hypothesis, since the prominence effect was produced because subjects interpreted 
and evaluated the given information differently when they were choosing between 
the alternatives than when they were rating them. The strategy compatibility 
hypothesis did not receive empirical support, since the prominence effect could not 
be explained in terms of simplifying heuristics used in choice. However, 
incongruent with both the value-belief restructuring and strategy compatibility, a 
difference between choices and judgments were not found when both were made 
of simultaneously presented options. 
The picture was not as clearcut in Study II. The results replicated the 
prominence effect in showing that choices were more often made of the option 
with the highest value on the predominant or prominent attribute. However, a 
prominence effect was also demonstrated for preference ratings. 
A prominence effect observed for preference ratings seemed to rule out the 
strategy compatibility hypothesis as the sole explanation. It is undeniable that the 
response was more quantitative in preference judgments than in choices, but 
subjects nevertheless showed an equally strong tendency to attend to the prominent 
attribute. 
However, the value-belief restructuring account was not supported either. 
The think-aloud protocols supported the assumption that subjects changed their 
values and beliefs when making choices. Such restructuring was also observed 
more frequently for choices than for preference ratings. Only in the case of choices 
was the observed value-belief restructuring accompanied by a prominence effect. 
Since a prominence effect was also obtained for the preference ratings, this form of 
restructuring could not be a sufficient explanation. 
A more general form of the compatibility hypothesis was therefore suggested 
based on editing-phase restructuring. Whereas the choice task is different from 
both the matching and preference-rating tasks in being qualitative rather than 
quantitative, preference ratings are different from matching in calling for judgments 
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of single options rather than matching one difference to another. Thus it was 
concluded that one may expect a prominence effect for preference ratings although 
it is not possible to predict the strength of it relative to choice. 
In both experiments of Study III, the prominence effect was replicated. 
Although the options were matched to be equally attractive, the option with the 
highest value on the prominent attribute was more often chosen. This held true 
irrespectively of whether the same or different subjects performed the matching 
task, whether the same subjects performed the matching task in the same or in a 
different session, or whether the missing values were the same or varied. 
Consistent with previous findings (Fischer & Hawkins, 1993), a prominence effect 
was presently also observed for preference ratings. In the first experiment a 
prominence effect was similarly found for choices to accept an option. This finding 
falsified the strategy compatibility hypothesis. 
In line with the value-belief restructuring hypothesis the think-aloud protocols in 
the first experiment supported the assumption that subjects restructured values and 
beliefs in the choice problems more frequently in connection with choices between 
options than in connection with preference ratings of sequentially presented 
options. In disagreement with the hypothesis, value-belief restructuring was 
however not more frequent for choices to accept than for preference ratings. 
Furthermore, only in the case of choices between options was the observed 
restructuring in this form accompanied by a prominence effect. Since a prominence 
effect was obtained for the preference ratings and choices to accept, value-belief 
restructuring could not be a sufficient explanation. The protocols further revealed 
that construing the problems in the first experiment as personally relevant did not 
lead to more value-belief restructuring. 
Disregarding an effect in the opposite direction confined to choices between 
options, the results were consistent with the structure compatibility hypothesis. 
Yet, in disagreement with the hypothesis, a prominence effect was observed in the 
first experiment for choices to accept an option. Also in disagreement with the 
hypothesis, in the second experiment a prominence effect was found when subjects 
simultaneously performed the matching task. Still, the prominence effect tended to 
be weaker in this condition as compared to a condition when the matching task 
was performed in a different session. 
The results of the experiments in Study IV provided further evidence for the 
prominence effect. As in previous research, a prominence effect was found also for 
preference ratings. However, the value-belief restructuring hypothesis was not 
supported in that the accountability manipulation did not reach significance in any 
of the experiments. Furthermore, the results suggested that the prominence effect 
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was decreased rather than increased by the use of small numerical value 
differences. Third, no reliable effects due to response mode was found in any of the 
analyses of the explanations and justifications.. 
The structure compatibility hypothesis was on the other hand supported by the 
fact that no reliable main effects of accountability was detected in the experiments. 
As suggested by the hypothesis, reliable main effects of numerical value difference 
in the predicted direction were generally obtained. Therefore, it seemed plausible 
to assume that the obtained results due to numerical value difference could be 
attributed to the same kind of information organization principle in choice as in 
preference ratings. 
The strategy compatibility hypothesis lacked support in that a prominence effect 
was found in choice as well as in preference ratings. The fact that numerical value 
differences had an effect on the prominence effect also spöke against the 
hypothesis. The present results instead pointed towards that both response mode 
and variations in the stimulus material affected the strategy being used. However, 
in accordance with the strategy compatibility explanation, the manipulation of 
accountability did neither increase nor decrease the prominence effect. 
In conclusion, a prominence effect was in most experiments found for both 
choices and preference ratings. This finding speaks against the strategy 
compatibility hypothesis suggested by Tversky et al. (1988). Instead, different 
forms of cognitive restructuring may provide a better account. Two such 
approaches have been proposed, based on value-belief restructuring and 
restructuring occurring in the so-called editing phase, respectively. As was revealed 
in the present studies, none of these approaches provided a single explanation. 
However, the structure compatibility hypothesis appeared to be the more viable 
explanation, in particular of the relation between experimental manipulations and 
response mode outcomes. These predictions were also found to be more important 
for the modification of the effect. The assumption is hence made that the 
predictions of the structure compatibility hypothesis are more vital for the 
structural modelling accounts of the phenomenon, that is, for the relation between 
input and output data. The predictions of the value-belief restructuring hypothesis, 
on the other hand, seemed to be more valid for the prominence effect found in 
choice than for those detected in preference ratings. Therefore, it cannot be 
excluded that qualitative and quantitative response modes may result in different 
value-belief restructuring operations, likewise leading to a prominence effect for 
both response modes. This would depend on whether there is a difference in the 
editing of information in judgment and choice. 
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